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Winston Churchill, in 
his notorious election 
radio address of 4 June 
1945, claimed that a 
socialist government, 
if elected, ‘would have 
to fall back on some 
form of Gestapo, no 
doubt very humanely 
directed in the first 
instance’. Less well 
remembered, but 
of considerable 
significance, are 
the passages in 
the broadcast that 
Churchill devoted 
to the Liberal Party. 
Richard Toye 
examines how 
Churchill frequently 
summoned up the 
memories of 1906 
to bolster his own 
position in politics.
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I
n May, after the Allies 
had achieved victory in 
Europe, the Liberals (with 
the exception of Gwilym 
Lloyd-George) had with-
drawn from Churchill’s gov-
erning coalition, at the same 
time as Labour. He now casti-
gated them for this, at the same 
time emphasising that although 
there was ‘a great doctrinal gulf ’ 
between Tories and socialists, 
‘There is no such gulf between 
the Conservative and National 
Government I have formed and 
the Liberals.’ He argued, ‘There 
is scarcely a Liberal sentiment 
which animated the great Lib-
eral leaders of the past which we 
do not inherit and defend.’2 In a 
speech at Oldham a few weeks 
later, he reiterated these senti-
ments. ‘I am a Liberal as much 
as a Tory’, he claimed. ‘I do not 
understand why Liberals pre-
tend they are different from us. 
We fight and stand for freedom 
and we have succeeded in bring-
ing forward a programme that 
any Liberal government led by 
Mr Lloyd George or Mr Asquith 
would have been proud to carry 
through in a Parliament.’3
The claims about the Lib-
erals could be seen as rather 
desperate stuff – almost as des-
perate, perhaps, as the ‘Gestapo’ 
a l legat ion. Fuming Libera l 
supporters might wel l have 
reflected that Churchill, who 
had in the past advanced his 
own career by twice switching 
party, was now trying to cloak 
his habitual opportunism in 
rhetoric of a particularly hyp-
ocritical kind. He laid claim 
to Liberal values in order to 
win votes, whilst at the same 
time he accused the Liberals 
themselves of having put party 
before country: ‘I am sorry to 
tell you that they have yielded 
to the tactical temptation, nat-
ural to politicians, to acquire 
more seats in the House of 
Commons, if they can, at al l 
costs.’4 As if Churchill himself 
had ever disdained to grub for 
a vote! 
Whatever the merits of his 
claims to uphold Liberal values, 
however, his efforts to present 
himself as an heir to the party’s 
traditions were more than a flash 
in the pan. They were, rather, 
part of a strategy that he had 
used intermittently over the pre-
vious twenty years, and which 
he would employ systematically 
with much fervour throughout 
the final decade of his career. He 
deployed his own history as a 
Liberal, and the memory of the 
Asquith–Lloyd George glory 
days, as a rhetorical resource in 
support of his current priorities. 
This article explores Church-
ill’s use of the ‘heritage of 1906’ 
during his post-Liberal phase, 
in order to show how interpre-
tations of the pre-1914 Liberal 
governments remained relevant 
to British politics for decades 
after Liberal England’s ‘strange 
death’.5 Such interpretations 
were highly contested: Church-
ill had to defend his record as 
well as exploit it, and he often 
did both things at the same time.
By 1945, of course, Church-
ill’s career as a Liberal in the 
formal sense was long over. It 
had begun in April 1904 when 
as a young MP – having had 
the Conservative Whip with-
drawn from him that Janu-
ary – he accepted an invitation 
from the Liberals of North-West 
Manchester to contest the seat 
at the next election. He made 
the symbolic gesture of cross-
ing the floor of the House of 
Commons on 31 May. But how 
long did he remain a Liberal? 
With the benefit of hindsight, it 
might seem that his decision to 
join David Lloyd George’s coa-
lition government (in 1917, as 
Minister of Munitions) put him 
beyond the pale of true Liberal-
ism. But this was not necessarily 
how it seemed at the time, for 
the full, drastic consequences 
of the 1916 split between Lloyd 
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George’s supporters and those 
of former Prime Minister H. H. 
Asquith were not immediately 
apparent. At any rate, the 1923 
reunion of the Asquithians with 
the former Coalition Liberals 
secured Churchill’s place within 
the fold, albeit only temporarily. 
The reconciliation was attended 
by an element of comedy. The 
National Liberal Club’s portraits 
of Lloyd George and Churchill 
had been taken down in 1921 
and consigned to the cellar; now 
they were brought up again and 
restored to their former glory.6 It 
is not clear whether the picture 
of Churchill was again removed 
in 1924 when, at the start of Feb-
ruary, he declined the offer to 
fight Bristol West for the Liber-
als. That moment should be seen 
as his definitive break with the 
party; by the end of the year he 
had been appointed Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in a Conserva-
tive government. 
In December 1905, when 
Britain’s last Liberal govern-
ment was formed, Churchill 
had been appointed Under-Sec-
retary for the Colonies. In 1908, 
he had replaced Lloyd George 
as President of the Board of 
Trade, when the latter was made 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. In 
his new role Churchill made 
signif icant contributions to 
social reform, notably through 
the creation of trade boards to 
enforce minimum wages in the 
‘sweated’ trades, the introduction 
of labour exchanges, and (in col-
laboration with Lloyd George, 
who dealt with the health side) 
the introduction of National 
Insurance to protect workers 
against unemployment and sick-
ness. In 1910 Churchill had been 
appointed Home Secretary and 
the following year First Lord of 
the Admiralty. In other words, 
he had developed a wide range 
of ministerial experience; but 
we may note that, in later years, 
when Churchill talked about his 
pre-1914 career in his speeches, 
it was generally his contribution 
to social policy and his alliance 
with Lloyd George of which he 
made most.
A sign of this was seen dur-
ing the 1923 election – the last 
he fought as a Liberal – when 
he strove, not for the last time, 
to demonstrate that he was not 
merely a ‘warmonger’. Accord-
ing to The Times report of a 
speech he made at Leicester, ‘He 
described the social legislation 
which had been passed between 
1905 and 1914, and said that he 
did not think that there was any 
important modern Act of social 
legislation in which he had not 
been concerned.’7 It is a little sur-
prising that during this election, 
which was fought on the issue of 
Conservative plans to introduce 
protectionism, he did not evoke 
the memory of the 1906 ‘free 
trade’ election more explicitly.8 
Perhaps he sensed that there 
was little political capital to be 
gained from doing so.
When he was at the Treasury, 
Churchill continued to refer to 
the 1906 era and to play up its 
social reforming aspect. He did 
so in order to secure a ‘progres-
sive’ lineage for the measures he 
now put forward. (It was of some 
relevance that Lloyd George and 
Asquith were, at the time of his 
appointment, both still in active 
politics, although the latter at 
last retired from the Liberal 
leadership in 1926.) As Martin 
Daunton has argued, Churchill 
‘consciously seized the mantle of 
David Lloyd George’ and aimed 
‘to appropriate the ideology of 
“new Liberalism” which had, to 
a large extent, migrated into the 
Labour Party’.9 
An example of this occurred 
in April 1925, when Church-
ill presented his f irst Budget. 
One of its features was the 
announcement that the gov-
ernment would soon introduce 
a bill to establish an insurance-
based pension scheme for the 
aged and for widows. This was 
a signif icant extension of the 
welfare state. ‘The old laissez-
faire or laissez-aller ideas of mid-
Victorian radicalism have been 
superseded, and no one has done 
more to supersede them than 
the right. Hon. Member for 
Caernarvon Boroughs [Lloyd 
George]’, Churchill said in his 
speech. ‘I am proud to have 
been associated with him from 
the very beginning of those 
large insurance ideas.’10 Lloyd 
George, in his initial response to 
the Budget, expressed his pleas-
ure that Churchill had under-
taken to complete the scheme 
of insurance that the pre-war 
Liberal government had only 
been able to establish in limited 
form: ‘I am very delighted that 
my right hon. Friend, who was 
associated with me at that time 
in carrying through that scheme 
has in his first year of Chancel-
lorship undertaken the comple-
tion of the scheme.’11 Churchill 
may therefore not only have 
succeeded in appealing to pro-
gressive opinion in general, but 
also in blunting some of Lloyd 
George’s own political attacks. 
On the other hand, he could 
sometimes be damaged by sus-
picions within his own party 
that he was ‘playing up to Lloyd 
George’, who was very much 
distrusted by other Conserva-
tives.12 The memory of the 1906 
era was a double-edged sword.
But if Churchill sought to 
appeal to liberal opinion, in the 
broadest sense, this did not pre-
vent him attacking the Liberal 
Party when he thought it right 
to do so. Even though, until at 
least 1931, he remained open to 
the idea of renewing his political 
cooperation with Lloyd George, 
he clashed with him repeatedly 
in public, notably over Britain’s 
1925 return to the Gold Stand-
ard, the 1926 General Strike, 
and the Liberal Party’s ambi-
tious proposals for public works. 
These last were a major point of 
controversy in the 1929 general 
election, and showed how ‘Lib-
eral traditions’ were subject to 
multiple interpretations. Lloyd 
George, for his part, now harked 
back less to the pre-1914 New 
Liberalism than to the period of 
his own wartime leadership, as 
he sought to establish his cre-
dentials as a man who could 
get things done. Churchill, for 
his part, harked back to the late 
nineteenth century. (‘We should 
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not try to compete with L.G.’, 
he remarked to his off icials, 
‘but take our stand on sound 
finance.’13) In one election speech 
he claimed that ‘The Liberals 
are being committed against all 
the traditions of Gladstonian 
finance to an absurd, erroneous 
and vicious policy. If the Liber-
als succumb to the temptations 
Lloyd George is now offering 
them for party purposes it will 
not be because they are Liber-
als, but only because they are 
electioneering politicians.’14 The 
obvious implication was that the 
Conservatives could be trusted 
to uphold Gladstone’s legacy, 
even if Mr. G’s own party could 
not.
In 1931, the Liberal Party frac-
tured into three groups: the fol-
lowers of John Simon (known 
as the Liberal Nationals), those 
of Herbert Samuel, and those 
of Lloyd George. The Lloyd 
George ‘family group’ was only 
four-strong, and far less signifi-
cant than the other two, both of 
which joined the Conservative-
dominated National Govern-
ment, although the Samuelites 
withdrew the following year. 
Churchill did not entirely give 
up hope of future collabora-
tion with individual Liberals, 
such as his friend Archibald 
Sinclair (who led the party in 
1935–45). Yet, to the extent that 
he remained eager to court Lib-
eral opinion, he does not appear 
to have used the memory of 1906 
– or other aspects of the ‘Lib-
eral tradition’ – as a significant 
point of reference. This in part 
reflected the issues – India and 
then rearmament – on which 
he campaigned during the 
1930s, and which were not eas-
ily susceptible to such treatment. 
Indeed, he dismissed govern-
ment proposals to grant greater 
self-government to India as ‘this 
bouquet of faded flowers of Vic-
torian Liberalism’.15 
After the fall of Neville Cham-
berlain in May 1940, the Liber-
als were generously represented 
– relative to their numbers in the 
Commons – in Churchill’s new 
coalition government, Sinclair 
becoming Secretary of State for 
Air. Churchill, understandably, 
devoted little thought to the 
party and its affairs for most of 
the war. On occasion he felt the 
government was getting inad-
equate support from the Liber-
als, and in 1942 he reprimanded 
Sinclair for this, at the same 
time reassuring him that ‘I have 
never measured the strength 
of the Liberal Party by its Par-
liamentary representation.’16 It 
seems fair to say that Churchill’s 
announcement in 1945 that he 
was a Liberal as much as he was 
a Conservative was not com-
pletely without precedent in his 
rhetoric; on the other hand, he 
had not felt compelled to articu-
late this particular aspect of his 
political identity for some con-
siderable time previously. It was, 
however, to become a familiar 
trope in the years to come.
There were some compelling 
reasons for him to resurrect the 
theme. First, although his care-
taker government was heavily 
dominated by Conservatives, 
Churchill was eager to make as 
much as he could of the fact that 
some non-Tories, including the 
remnants of the Simonites, had 
agreed to join it. One of these 
was the sixth Earl of Rose-
bery, son of Lord Rosebery, the 
former Liberal Prime Minister, 
who became Secretary of State 
for Scotland. Another recruit 
was Lloyd George’s son Gwilym 
who, just a few days before his 
father’s death in March 1945, 
made a public statement of 
his intention to fight the next 
election ‘as a Liberal candidate 
supporting the National Gov-
ernment’.17 Therefore, when 
the other Liberals left office, he 
continued in post as Minister of 
Fuel and Power. This Liberal 
veneer may have been thin, but 
it allowed Churchill to claim 
that his administration had a 
non-party, ‘National’ character, 
suitable to cope with the still 
ongoing war with Japan. In his 
‘Gestapo’ broadcast, he empha-
sised that the government still 
had ‘a Rosebery and a Lloyd-
George to carry forward the 
flags of their fathers’.18 There was 
also a second reason. Declaring 
his liberalism allowed Churchill 
to stress not only his bipartisan 
approach, but also his progres-
sivism. This was essential in the 
face of a credible Labour chal-
lenge based on promises of radi-
cal economic and social reform. 
To a degree, Churchil l was 
forced to deploy the memory 
‘I Am A LIBerAL AS much AS A Tory’ wInSTon churchILL AnD The memory oF 1906
Liberals together: 
David Lloyd 
George and 
Winston Churchill, 
ca. 1910
  Journal of Liberal History 54  Spring 007
of 1906 because he had so little 
else to play with. His domestic 
record in the 1920s had some 
things to recommend it, but his 
Chancellorship (and, in particu-
lar, his decision to return to the 
Gold Standard) was now too 
closely associated with the per-
ceived failures of the inter-war 
years to be of much use to him 
politically. 
Churchill’s claim to the tra-
dition was, of course, contested. 
Lloyd George’s daughter Megan, 
an MP on the left of the Liberal 
Party, claimed that she, as an 
opponent of the government, 
was upholding her father’s beliefs: 
‘I am a David-Lloyd-George Lib-
eral’, she declared.19 By contrast, 
one Labour tactic was to claim 
that there was indeed an anal-
ogy between Lloyd George and 
Churchill. ‘If Mr Churchill were 
to win this election the conse-
quences would be exactly what 
they were after the Tory victory 
of 1918’, argued Harold Laski, 
Chairman of Labour’s National 
Executive Committee. ‘They 
would use Mr Churchill for their 
purposes and would then throw 
him over in the same way as the 
Tory party threw over Lloyd 
George [in 1922] when they had 
squeezed out of him the last 
drop of utility they could get.’20 
Laski’s comments were part 
of a wider strategy. Churchill 
was undoubtedly popular as an 
individual. Labour’s best hope, 
therefore, was to acknowledge 
his strengths as a war leader, and 
avoid personal attacks on him, 
whilst suggesting that if returned 
to power he would be in hock 
to a reactionary Tory party and 
no good as a peacetime premier. 
This approach certainly did not 
do Labour any harm. When the 
results were announced on 26 
July it turned out that Labour 
had won a landslide victory. 
The Liberals won only twelve 
seats. There was little reason to 
imagine that the decline was not 
utterly terminal, and Churchill 
might have been expected to 
ignore the party entirely from 
now on. Yet, as Leader of the 
Opposition, he showed himself 
eager to work with it. He 
wanted to do so in order to build 
a broad anti-socialist front as a 
means of regaining office. Fail-
ing that, he wanted to win the 
votes of former Liberal support-
ers by emphasising the Tories’ 
claims to be the true heirs of 
Liberalism. The contested legacy 
of Lloyd George was of contin-
ued importance, as the Liberals 
themselves recognised. Clement 
Davies had replaced Sinclair as 
Liberal leader, because the lat-
ter had lost his seat in the elec-
tion. Sinclair wrote to Davies in 
December 1945 about Gwilym 
Lloyd-George: ‘Gwilym is 
behaving badly. What are we 
to do about him? – leave him to 
smoulder on the Tory bonfire, 
or try to snatch him from the 
burning?’ Sinclair favoured try-
ing to win him back – which in 
fact was a lost cause. One of his 
arguments for doing so was that 
otherwise ‘The Tories will boast, 
at the next Election – as Win-
ston boasted in the last Election 
– of having a Lloyd George in 
their ranks.’21 This was a sound 
prediction, although the Con-
servatives found other Liberal 
cards to play too, even going so 
far as to secure an endorsement 
from Gladstone’s grandson.22
Churchill, for his part, took 
the view that ‘A Party is not a 
club, becoming more and more 
eclectic. It ought to be a “snow-
ball starting an avalanche”.’23 
He therefore stressed in public 
that Conservatives and Liber-
als should work together as ‘co-
belligerents’ against the Labour 
government.24 He achieved 
mixed success. In May 1947, 
under the so-called Woolton–
Teviot pact, the residuum of the 
Liberal Nationals agreed to form 
joint constituency associations 
with the Conservatives.25 How-
ever, a subsequent approach by 
Churchill to the Liberal Party 
proper was rebuffed;26 and the 
Liberal leaders were enraged 
when parliamentary candidates 
were selected by the new joint 
constituency associations to 
run under the label ‘Liberal and 
Conservative’ or some variant 
thereof. (There were around 
f ifty such candidates, includ-
ing Gwilym Lloyd-George, in 
the 1950 election, although even 
in his case a large section of the 
local Conservative Association 
would have much preferred a 
genuine Tory.27) The Liberals 
thought their party name was 
being misappropriated. This 
led, during the 1950 election 
campaign, to a public exchange 
of letters with Clement Davies, 
in which Churchill ridiculed 
the latter’s complaints: ‘As you 
were yourself for eleven years 
a National Liberal and in that 
capacity supported the Govern-
ments of Mr Baldwin and Mr 
Neville Chamberlain, I should 
not presume to correct your 
knowledge of the moral, intel-
lectual and legal aspects of add-
ing a prefix or a suffix to the 
honoured name of Liberal.’28 
This was certainly amusing, but 
it did nothing to assist Church-
ill’s hopes of cooperation with 
the independent Liberals. 
There were some within 
the Liberal Party, such as Vio-
let Bonham Carter (Asquith’s 
daughter), who were sympa-
thetic to the idea of coopera-
tion, but there was considerable 
hostility from others, includ-
ing Clement Davies, who had 
been alienated by Churchill’s 
personal conduct.29 In August 
1947 Lord Woolton, the Con-
servative Party Chairman, sent 
Churchill some extracts from 
recent Liberal speeches. ‘They 
are as violently partisan and anti-
Tory as anything the Socialists 
have ever perpetrated’, he wrote, 
‘and I think we delude ourselves 
if we imagine that such people 
will enter into any agreement 
with us.’30 Churchill responded 
robustly, urging Woolton to 
do everything in his power ‘to 
promote unity of action with 
the Liberals on the basis of an 
Independent Liberal Party. On 
this being achieved depends 
the future revival of Britain.’31 
Moreover, in 1948, he expressed 
to his Shadow Cabinet ‘the 
wish that Liberals who wished 
to join the Conservative Party 
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should be given every facil-
ity to get seats.’32 In the general 
election of February 1950, the 
Liberals put forward 475 candi-
dates. This threatened to split 
the anti-Labour vote. There was 
an extremely limited number of 
local pacts with the Conserva-
tives, but the idea did not spread 
– rather, we may imagine, to 
Churchill’s chagrin.
Although Churchill may have 
over-rated the chances of secur-
ing direct cooperation with the 
Liberal Party, his quest for the 
support of Liberal opinion in 
general was perfectly rational. 
As Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska 
has shown, a research report 
commissioned by the Tories in 
1949 indicated strong similarities 
between self-declared Liberals 
and the typical floating voter. It 
seemed that, although in 1945 
only 2.5 per cent of ‘the Doubt-
fuls’ had voted Liberal, nearly 
a quarter of them identif ied 
strongly with the Liberal Party. 
The report argued that ‘the label 
“Liberal” is being used as a con-
venient cover … the characteris-
tic “Floater” as described above 
should prove a highly profitable 
subject for Conservative atten-
tion.’33 During the election cam-
paign itself Churchill went so 
far as to offer one of the Con-
servative Party’s broadcast slots 
to Bonham Carter, who had not 
been one of the Liberal Party’s 
own chosen broadcasters. She 
turned it down, seemingly at 
the behest of Davies, and with 
apparent regret.34 In his speeches, 
Churchill had to make efforts to 
rebut the allegation that, when 
Home Secretary in 1910, ‘he 
had sent troops to shoot down 
Welsh miners’ in the Tonypandy 
riots.35 (In fact, no one had been 
killed.) He also sought to make 
more positive use of the mem-
ory of the past, in order to claim 
some credit himself for Labour’s 
popular reforms:
I was the friend and comrade 
of the most famous Welsh-
man of our time, David Lloyd 
George … He it was who 
launched the Liberal forces of 
this country effectively into 
the broad stream of social bet-
terment and social security 
along which all modern par-
ties now steer. Nowadays this 
is called ‘the welfare State’. We 
did not christen it, but it was 
our child.
At the same time he made 
oblique reference to Aneurin 
Bevan who, as Attlee’s Minis-
ter of Health, had pioneered the 
National Health Service. Labour 
liked to portray Bevan as ‘a sec-
ond Lloyd George’, but Church-
ill emphasised ‘There can be no 
greater insult to his memory’.36 
Churchill thus deployed the 
heritage of the New Liberalism 
in part in order to prevent his 
political opponents from laying 
claim to it themselves.
Labour won the 1950 elec-
tion, but with a greatly reduced 
majority. (Labour could take a 
small amount of comfort from 
its candidate’s narrow defeat of 
Gwilym Lloyd-George at Pem-
broke.) The Liberals lost three 
seats – a quarter of their total 
representation – and 319 depos-
its. Yet Churchill’s enthusiasm 
for cooperation with the Liber-
als remained undimmed. ‘I am 
having a very difficult time with 
Churchill’, wrote Woolton that 
September: 
He is determined to bring 
about some arrangement with 
the Liberals … A month ago 
he asked me to see him, and I 
told him that I saw no prospect 
of the Party finding his views 
acceptable. It was a diff icult 
meeting, in which he told me 
that of course he would resign 
if he could not have his way: I 
told him that I thought perhaps 
we had better both resign, and 
then there need not be any fur-
ther conversation about it.37 
Neither man did resign, but 
stalemate had been reached.
It seems unlikely that the 
Tories could, at this stage, have 
gained much from a pact or 
alliance. When the next elec-
tion came, in October 1951, the 
Liberals could muster only 109 
candidates. Churchill, seeking 
to sweep up as many ex-Liberal 
voters as possible, continued to 
play the Lloyd George card. He 
lent strong support to Gwilym 
Lloyd-George, who, despite 
deep divisions in the local party 
association, stood and won as 
a Conservative at Newcastle. 
Elsewhere, Conservative leaf-
lets quoted a 1925 denunciation 
of socialism by David Lloyd 
George – he had described it 
as ‘the very negation of liberty’ 
– and also included a picture of 
him. Megan Lloyd George pro-
tested against this attempt by 
the Tories to claim her father’s 
endorsement from beyond the 
grave.38 She herself was narrowly 
defeated at Anglesey. Church-
ill also emphasised the Asquith 
connection by speaking for Bon-
ham Carter, who had no Con-
servative opponent, at Colne 
Valley. She lost anyway.
The Conservatives won the 
general election with a majority 
of seventeen. In those seats where 
a Liberal had stood in 1950, but 
not in 1951, the Tories took the 
bulk of the Liberal vote – which 
may suggest that Churchill’s 
efforts to court Liberal opinion 
had in fact paid off.39 Although 
the Liberals won only six seats, 
he offered a Cabinet post to 
Clement Davies (albeit only as 
Minister of Education, a post to 
which Churchill did not attach 
much importance). Davies, in 
refusing, helped to safeguard the 
future of the Liberals as an inde-
pendent force. Churchill made 
Gwilym Lloyd-George Min-
ister of Food and then, in 1954, 
Home Secretary. We should not 
of course imagine that he was 
motivated in these appointments 
exclusively by the belief that 
the Lloyd George name won 
votes. Nonetheless, debates over 
the Lloyd George legacy con-
tinued, even after Churchill 
finally retired as Prime Minis-
ter in April 1955, at the age of 80. 
Anthony Eden, who succeeded 
him, called an election, which 
took place in May. During the 
campaign Churchil l – who 
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remained an MP – ridiculed 
Megan Lloyd George’s recent 
decision to join Labour. (In 1957 
she won a by-election for the 
party at Carmarthen.) ‘This is a 
big jump for anyone, especially 
for her father’s daughter, to take’, 
he said.40 Even at this late date, 
there was still a vestigial ‘Lloyd 
George factor’ in British politics.
It remains to us to ask: when 
Churchill asserted that he was a 
Liberal as much as a Conserva-
tive, was he sincere, and if so, 
what did he mean? It would be 
easy to dismiss his remarks as a 
transparent electioneering stunt. 
However, during the 1940s and 
1950s, Churchill did pay the Lib-
eral Party the compliment of his 
attention. He perceived it both 
as an electoral threat and as a 
potential ally and, crucially, he 
clearly felt that there was a body 
of ‘liberal opinion’ in Britain 
that deserved to be courted. 
What were those sentiments 
‘which animated the great Lib-
eral leaders of the past’ that he 
claimed to inherit and defend? 
One of his most important 
themes was, of course, the mem-
ory of the New Liberal welfare 
reforms, which he deployed as 
a guarantee that a future Tory 
government would continue to 
ride ‘the broad stream of social 
betterment’. By contrast, he did 
not present himself as a defender 
of that key Liberal value, free 
trade, any more than he raised 
that other totem of the 1906 elec-
tion, the issue of Chinese labour 
in South Africa. It would have 
been difficult for him to do so, 
because the Conservative Party 
as a whole – although, interest-
ingly, not the National Liberals 
– remained hostile to it.41 (None-
theless, by the end of his final 
term as Prime Minister, his gov-
ernment had moved significantly 
in the direction of freer trade.42) 
Yet, arguably, the most impor-
tant element in his 1940s and 
’50s vision of Liberalism was his 
appeal to the concept of ‘free-
dom’ more broadly. This was at 
the centre of his argument as to 
why Liberals and Conservatives 
should band together to defeat 
Labour. As he put it in his public 
letter to Davies in 1950: ‘No one 
can be at once a Socialist and a 
Liberal. The establishment of a 
Socialist State controlling all the 
means of production, distribu-
tion and exchange, is the most 
complete contradiction of Lib-
eral principles that now exists.’43 
This was why the memory of 
Lloyd George in particular was 
so useful to him, as an example 
of a politician who had com-
bined belief in social improve-
ment with an equally strong 
conviction that socialism and 
l iberty were fundamental ly 
incompatible. 
Indeed, it was no coinci-
dence that Churchill’s 4 June 
1945 broadcast contained not 
only the ‘Gestapo’ allegation but 
also an appeal to Liberals. The 
two aspects were intertwined. 
Churchill is generally thought, 
when suggesting that a Labour 
government would be obliged 
to rely on totalitarian meth-
ods, to have been drawing (in a 
clumsy fashion) on the ideas of F. 
A. Hayek, whose book The Road 
to Serfdom had been published 
the previous year. In doing so, 
he was attempting to ensure that 
Liberals fell down on his side of 
the ‘doctrinal gulf ’ that sepa-
rated the Conservatives from 
socialists. Calling on Liberals to 
‘search their hearts’ he declared:
My friends, I must tell you that 
a Socialist policy is abhorrent 
to the British ideas of freedom. 
Although it is now put forward 
in the main by people who have 
a good grounding in the Lib-
eralism and Radicalism of the 
early part of this century, there 
can be no doubt that Socialism 
is inseparably interwoven with 
Totalitarianism and the abject 
worship of the State.44
As his rhetorical use of the 
memory of the 1906 government 
shows, his interpretation of early 
twentieth-century liberalism 
and radicalism was a selective 
one. We may also doubt that 
the Conservative Party he led 
was, as he made out, really much 
of a repository for enlightened 
liberal values. Nevertheless, if 
it was not, that was not neces-
sarily entirely Churchill’s own 
fault; and, even if he was moti-
vated in part by opportunism, 
he still deserves credit for mak-
ing the liberal ideals of freedom 
and social betterment a key ele-
ment of his post-1945 political 
discourse.
Richard Toye is a Fellow of Homer-
ton College, Cambridge. His most 
recent book is Lloyd George and 
Churchill: Rivals for Greatness 
(Macmillan, 2007). This autumn he 
will take up a Senior Lectureship at 
the University of Exeter.
1 I am grateful to David Dutton and 
J. Graham Jones for helpful com-
ments and suggestions. Any errors 
that remain are, of course, my own 
responsibility.
2 ‘“Vote National, Not Party”: Prime 
Minister’s Broadcast Attack on 
Socialism’, The Times, 5 June 1945.
3 ‘Mr Churchill in the North’, The 
Times, 27 June 1945.
4 ‘“Vote National, Not Party”’, The 
Times, 5 June 1945.
5 The Strange Death of Liberal England 
was, of course, the title of a famous 
book by George Dangerfield which 
was published in 1936.
6 ‘Out of the Tomb’, The Times, 22 
Nov. 1923.
7 ‘“An Electioneer ing Cry.” Mr 
Churchill On The Capital Levy’, 
The Times, 5 Dec. 1923.
8 His speech on 16 November 1923 at 
the Free Trade Hall in Manchester 
did include some remarks observ-
ing that Joseph Chamberlain’s dire 
predictions about what would hap-
pen if his plans were not adopted 
had not come true. Robert Rhodes 
James (ed.), Churchill Speaks: Win-
ston S. Churchill in Peace and War: 
Collected Speeches, 1897–1963 (Wind-
ward, Leicester, 1981), p. 426.
9 Martin Daunton, Just Taxes: The 
Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914–
1979 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2002), p. 135.
10 Speech of 28 Apr. 1925. Unless 
otherwise stated, all Churchill’s 
speeches cited are to be found in 
Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Win-
ston S. Churchill: His Complete 
Speeches, 1897–1963, 8 vols. (Chelsea 
House, New York, 1974).
11 Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 183, 28 
April 1925, col. 95.
12 Wi l l iam Br idgeman to M.C. 
Bridgeman, 29 July 1928, in Philip 
Williamson (ed.), The Modernisation 
‘I Am A LIBerAL AS much AS A Tory’ wInSTon churchILL AnD The memory oF 1906
even if 
churchill 
was moti-
vated in 
part by 
oppor-
tunism, 
he still 
deserves 
credit for 
making 
the liberal 
ideals of 
freedom 
and social 
betterment 
a key ele-
ment of his 
post-1945 
political 
discourse.
Journal of Liberal History 54  Spring 007   
of Conservative Politics: The Dia-
ries and Letters of William Bridge-
man 1904–1935 (The Historians’ 
Press, London, 1988), p. 215.
13 Keith Middlemas (ed.), Tho-
mas Jones: Whitehall Diary Vol. 
II: 1926–1930 (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 1969), pp. 
175–76 (entry for 6 March 1929). 
14 ‘The exploitation of unemploy-
ment: Mr Churchill on “One 
of the meanest things”’, The 
Times, 14 May 1929.
15 Speech of 5 June 1935.
16 W i n s t on  Chu r ch i l l  t o 
Archibald Sinclair, 31 Jan. 1942, 
in Ian Hunter (ed.), Winston 
and Archie: The Letters of Sir 
Archibald Sinclair and Winston S. 
Churchill, 1915–1960 (Politico’s, 
London, 2005), pp. 338–39.
17 ‘Major Lloyd-George’s Future’, 
The Times, 20 March 1945.
18 ‘“Vote National, Not Party”’, 
The Times, 5 June 1945.
19 ‘In West Riding Valleys’, The 
Times, Wednesday, 4 July 1945.
20 ‘Government Hopes in Scot-
land’, The Times, 5 July 1945.
21 Archibald Sinclair to Clement 
Davies, 3 Dec. 1945, Thurso 
Papers, Churchi l l Col lege, 
Cambridge, THRS IV 1/10. 
It should be noted that, after 
1945, Gwilym Lloyd-George 
hyphenated h i s surname, 
whereas his si ster Megan 
Lloyd George did not; she 
had objected to her father’s 
acceptance of a peerage, as Earl 
Lloyd-George of Dwyfor, in 
the last weeks of his life, and 
her refusal to use the hyphen 
reflected this.
22 Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 
‘Rationing, Austerity and the 
Conservative Party after 1945’, 
The Historical Journal, Vol. 37, 
No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 173–97 
at p. 192.
23 Churchill to Lord Woolton, 3 
Aug. 1946, Conservative Party 
Archive, Bodleian Library, 
Oxford, CCO 3/1/64.
24 ‘Dangerous Economic Posi-
tion: Mr Churchill’s Attack On 
The Government’, The Times, 
17 May 1947.
25 See Michael Kandiah, ‘Con-
servative Leaders, strategy 
– and “Consensus”? 1945–64, 
in Harriet Jones and Michael 
Kandiah (eds.), The Myth of 
Consensus: New Views on Brit-
ish History, 1945–64 (Macmil-
lan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
1996), pp. 58–78, at 62–63.
26 Alan Watkins, The Liberal 
Dilemma (MacGibbon and Kee, 
1966), p. 48. 
27 E. C. Bradbury to the General 
Director of the Conservative 
Party (Stephen Piersenne), 21 
Jan. 1950, Appendix B, Con-
servative Party Archive, CCO 
4/3/43.
28 Churchill to Davies, 25 Jan. 
1950, quoted in Martin Gilbert, 
Winston S. Churchill, vol. VIII: 
‘Never Despair’, 1945–1965 (Hein-
emann, London, 1988), p. 504.
29 See Davies to Sinclair, 30 May 
1946, Thurso Papers, Churchill 
College, Cambridge, THRS 
IV, 1/10. It is possible that Dav-
ies warmed more to the idea 
as time went on given that, by 
1950, he was reported as say-
ing that he would not mind if 
individual constituency parties 
made their own local agree-
ments for cooperation spon-
taneously. (I am grateful to 
David Dutton for this informa-
tion.) This may, however, have 
reflected his recognition that 
he could not control the situa-
tion on the ground.
30 Lord Woolton to WSC, 7 
Aug. 1947, Churchill Papers, 
Churchill College, Cambridge, 
CHUR 2/64/21.
31 Churchil l to Lord Woolton, 
11 Aug. 1947, Churchill Papers, 
CHUR 2/64/19–20.
32 Conclusions of Consultative 
Committee, 14 July 1948, Con-
servative Party Archive, Bod-
leian Library, Oxford, LCC 
1/1/3.
33 ‘The floating vote’, 6 Dec. 1949, 
quoted in Zweiniger-Bar-
gielowska, ‘Rationing, Auster-
ity and the Conservative Party 
after 1945’, p. 191.
34 H. G. Nicholas, The British 
General Election of 1950 (Macmil-
lan, London, 1951), pp. 86–87.
35 Ibid., p. 94.
36 Speech of 8 Feb. 1950. 
37 Woolton to Lord Salisbury, 28 
Sept. 1950, Woolton Papers, 
Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS 
Woolton 21, ff. 73–83.
38 D. E. Butler, The British Gen-
eral Election of 1951 (Macmillan, 
London, 1952), p. 95.
39 Ibid., p. 247.
40 Speech of 17 May 1955. 
41 National Liberal Policy, The 
Times, 6 Oct 1951.
42 See Scott Kelly, The Myth of 
Mr. Butskell: The Politics of 
British Economic Policy, 1950–55 
(Ashgate, Aldershot, 2002), pp. 
159–71.
43 Churchil l to Davies, 25 Jan. 
1950, quoted in Gilbert, Never 
Despair, p. 504.
44 ‘“Vote National, Not Party”: 
Prime Minister’s Broadcast 
Attack on Socialism’, The Times, 
5 June 1945.
‘Maistly Scotch: 
Campbell-Bannerman 
and Liberal leadership 
(continued from page 
37)
 5 Although the apparent pros-
pect of a Gordon Brown pre-
miership has induced some 
sections of the Scottish media 
to reacquaint themselves with 
the Scots who have made it to 
No 10 Downing St.; see Allan 
Burnett, ‘The Scottish Premier 
League’, Sunday Herald, 7 Jan. 
2007, ‘Seven days’ section, pp, 
14–15.
6 Edinburgh, National Library of 
Scotland, Rosebery MSS, MS 
10002, ff.40–43, Campbell-Ban-
nerman to Rosebery, 10, 12 Jun. 
1886.
7 BL, Add. Mss, 44117, f.55, 
Campbel l -Bannerman to 
Gladstone, 11 Jun. 1886.
8 Wilson, CB, 122. In making 
this remark he did not refer to 
whisky but to Scottish produce, 
such as the soft fruit grown on 
the farms around his home at 
Meigle.
9 Wilson, CB, 349; Spender, Life, 
i, 336 ; George L. Bernstein, 
‘Sir Henry Campbell-Banner-
man and the Liberal Imperial-
ists’, Journal of British Studies, 23 
(1983), pp. 111–13.
10 For an assertion of the unity 
of the party see a speech at 
Dalkeith in October 1900, 
Scotsman, 2 Oct. 1900, p. 6.
11 Quoted by Paul Readman, 
‘The Conservative party, patri-
otism and British politics: the 
case of the general election of 
1900’, Journal of British Studies, 
40 (2001), p. 116.
12 Edinburgh, National Library 
of Scotland, Murray of Elibank 
MSS, MS 8801, f. 29, Campbell-
Bannerman to Murray, 12 Sep. 
1903.
13 B.L., Add, MS 41252, ff. 235–39, 
Sir Henry Campbel l-Ban-
nerman’s leadership, notes 
from Scotland, by W[illiam] 
W[ebster], Jun. 1922.
14 Wilson, CB, 354.
15 David W. Gutzke, ‘Rosebery 
and Campbell-Bannerman: the 
conflict over leadership recon-
sidered’, Bulletin of the Institute 
of Historical Research, 54 (1981), 
241-50.
16 I was forcibly reminded of this 
point at the conference from 
which this article arises by 
David Howarth, Alan Beith 
and Duncan Brack. I am grate-
ful for their comments.
17 T. Boyle, ‘The formation of 
Campbell-Bannerman’s gov-
ernment in December 1905: a 
memorandum by J.A. Spender’, 
Bulletin of the Institute of Histori-
cal Research, 45 (1972), pp. 283–
302; Wilson, CB, pp. 423–66; 
Spender, Life, ii, pp. 188–205.
18 Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, 
vol. 153, cols 990–92, 12 Mar. 
1906.
19 A. J. A. Morr is, ‘Banner-
man, Sir Henry Campbel l- 
(1836–1908)’, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography (Oxford, 
2004) 
20 Dunfermline Press, 13 Jan. 1906
21 Harris and Hazlehurst, ‘Camp-
bell Bannerman as Prime Min-
ister’, p. 381; Wilson, CB, pp. 
549–66, esp. 562.
22 George. L. Bernstein, Liberal-
ism and Liberal Politics in Edward-
ian England (London, 1986), pp. 
30–31.
23 Rowland, The Last Liberal Gov-
ernments, pp. 55, 132.
24 Quoted by Wilson, CB, p. 78.
25 NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 
10002, ff. 13–14, Campbell-Ban-
nerman to Rosebery, 27 Oct. 
1884.
26 Quoted by Wilson, CB, p. 155.
27 NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 
10002, f f. 184–85, Note by 
Campbell Bannerman, 16 Mar. 
1894.
28 Scotsman, 22 Dec. 1905, p. 5.
29 John Brown, ‘Scottish and 
English land legislation’, Scot-
tish Historical Review, 47 (1968).
30 The following section is based 
on Ewen A. Cameron, Land for 
the People? The British Govern-
ment and the Scottish Highlands¸ c. 
1880–1925 (East Linton, 1996), pp. 
124–43.
31 Parl iamentary Debates, 4th 
series, vol. 180, col. 988, 13 Aug. 
1907.
32 B.L., Add. MS, 41230, f. 208, 
Campbell-Bannerman to Sin-
clair, 1 Jan. 1908.
33 Quoted by Wilson, CB, p. 588; 
Spender, Life, ii, p. 321; Glas-
gow Herald, 26 Jan. 1907.
34 G. R. Searle, A New England? 
Peace and War, 1886 to 1918 
(Oxford, 2004), p. 362 ; Ber-
nstein, Liberalism, pp. 83–86; 
Wilson, CB, pp. 554–60.
35 Quoted by Wilson, CB, p. 115.
36 Patr icia Ja l land, ‘A Liberal 
Chief Secretary and the Irish 
question: Augustine Birrel l, 
1907–1914’, Historical Journal, 19 
(1976), pp. 426–30.
37 Harris and Hazlehurst, ‘Camp-
bell Bannerman as Prime Min-
ister’, pp. 377–81.
‘mAISTLy ScoTch’: cAmpBeLL-BAnnermAn AnD LIBerAL LeADerShIp
